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It is the purpose of this congress to show the lasting value of the 
thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, the patron saint of academic 
institutions, where theology and philosophy are taught not only at 
the speculative level but also in their applications for practical 
life. In this conference, the importance of Thomas’s moral thought 
should be brought out. Since the subject is immense and the time 
allotted is limited, I can only briefly touch on what I assume to be 
the most noteworthy themes, which, I hope, will show the 
unsurpassed depth and lasting truth of Thomas’s moral thought. 
 
 
1. DID ST. THOMAS DEVELOP A PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS? 
 
A first question is whether we can speak of a Thomistic 
philosophical ethics. The Angelic Doctor was foremost a 
theologian, and never taught philosophy at the Faculty of Arts in 
Paris or in Naples. It is true that he wrote an in-depth commentary 
on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, but some students of 
Thomas argue that his Aristotelian commentaries do not express 
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his own views but are just stating Aristotle’s positions with great 
clarity. Others, however, say that he is not a reliable interpreter of 
the Stagirite: he corrects him and introduces Christian viewpoints 
into his explanation of the text.1 Yet R. Gauthier, the editor of the 
remarkable Leonine edition of the Sententia in libros Ethicorum, 
has argued that Aquinas considered the Nicomachean Ethics not as 
a summary of Aristotle’s views, but simply as the moral 
philosophy.2 For St. Thomas, Aristotle’s text was a valuable 
treatise of ethics, whose contents he himself accepted. I must say 
that I fully agree with Fr. Gauthier’s appraisal.3 However, to 
perform an exposé of the science of morals according to the 
correct order of themes, as Thomas himself would write it, we 
must go beyond the Commentary and turn to the Second Part of the 
Summae Theologiae.4 
It is true that the Summa is a theological treatise. Nevertheless, 
large sections of the text unfold at the level of natural reason 
(although they were elaborated in the light of the sed contra 
arguments, which are mostly taken from divine revelation or the 
doctrine of the Church, and are clearly subservient to the theology 
of faith). In the First Part, we find such texts in the articles on the 
Five Ways, the discussion of the attributes of God, and so 
forth. Similarly, in the Second Part we have a complete and well 
ordered exposition of ethics as elaborated by natural reason. When 
one carefully analyzes the relevant questions and articles this 
becomes obvious. This is the reason why in this conference I shall 
rely mainly on what Aquinas writes in the Summa. 
However, I have no wish to downgrade the theological value of 
the work, or to create a rupture between philosophical ethics and 
__________________________ 
1. H. V. JAFFA, Thomism and Aristotelianism: A Study of the Commentary 
by St. Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics, Chicago, 1952. 
2. S. THOMAE DE AQUINO, Sententia libri Ethicorum, ed. Leonina, I, 267*. 
3. See “St. Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics”, in 
L.J. ELDERS SVD; K. HEDWICH, The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas, Città del 
Vaticano, 1984, pp. 9-49. 
4. Cf. the preface to the Summa Theologiae: “secundum ordinem disci-
plinae” and not “secundum quod requirebat librorum expositio.” 
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moral theology.5 Man’s one and only ultimate end is the 
supernatural vision of God, and this dogma exercises its influence 
on the entire treatise. Thomas repeatedly stresses that the happiness 
which Aristotle’s philosophical ethics speak about, is imperfect6 
and that man’s real happiness consists in the vision of God. When 
dealing with the natural law, Thomas continually stresses its 
dependence on the eternal law. Moreover, the natural law is 
completed by the Lex Nova, the grace of the Holy Spirit in 
Christians. But there is more: Thomas connects the intellectual 
virtues, which Aristotle had mentioned, with the gifts of the Holy 
Spirit, indicating that the natural virtues find their fulfillment 
through divine grace. Aristotle’s contemplation of the physical 
universe is to be replaced by a contemplation of the world of the 
world as God’s creation, and an understanding and enjoyment of 
revealed truth, in the presence of God. Although it is possible to 
construct a philosophical ethics on the basis of the questions of the 
Second Part of the Summa Theologiae, the text remains a 
theological text because it is ordered to man’s supernatural life.7 
Some authors have argued that because of the single, 
supernatural end of man an authentic philosophical ethics is not 
posible.8 According to Maritain, philosophical ethics considers 
man as if he were living in the state of uncorrupted nature, whereas 
in reality he is a member of fallen mankind. The principles upon 
which ethics is based, he adds, depend on theological insights and 
for that reason ethics is a science subject to theology. However, 
Maritain’s arguments were rejected by several leading 
__________________________ 
5. Perhaps A. D. SERTILLANGES, La philosophie morale de saint Thomas 
d’Aquin, Paris2, 1916, and M. WITTMANN, Die Ethik des hl. Thomas von Aquin, 
München, 1933, went into this direction. 
6. In I Ethic., lect. 9. 
7. Cf. A. PATFOORT, “Morale et pneumatologie chez Saint Thomas. Une 
observation de la Ia-IIae”, in La teologia morale nella storia e nella problematica 
attuale, Roma, 1960, 63-92. L. ELDERS, “La morale de saint Thomas, une éthique 
philosophique?”, Doctor Communis, (1977), pp. 192-205. 
8. J. MARITAIN, De la philosophie chrétienne, Paris, 1933, pp. 101 ff.; 
Science et sagesse, Paris, 1935, pp. 327 ff.; Du savoir moral, Paris, 1936. See also 
J. PIEPER, Hinführung zu Thomas von Aquin, p. 211. 
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Thomists.9 Moreover, it is obvious that there does exist an 
impressive philosophical ethics. One only has to read the 
Nicomachean Ethics to convince oneself. Where Aristotle’s treatise 
was incomplete, St. Thomas has completed it; he presented its 
contents in a coherent form, in particular by introducing the natural 
law, the first principles of the practical intellect and by reordering 
the virtues. 
 
 
2. THE SOURCES OF AQUINAS’S MORAL THOUGHT 
 
With regard to the question of the sources of Aquinas’s ethics 
one must mention in the first place Holy Scripture, the doctrine of 
the Church, the writing of the Church Fathers, especially 
St. Ambrose, St. John Chrysostome, St. Gegory of Nyssa 
(Nemesius), St. Augustine, St. Gregory the Great, St. John 
Damascene, Ps.-Dionysius, et al. These thinkers exercised a direct 
influence on St. Thomas’s moral theology and an indirect influence 
on his ethics. In regards to this question, we must point out that 
several of the Fathers, and indeed Aquinas himself, noted that that 
which the divine law demands from us in the field of ethics, is in 
agreement with what our human nature tells us to do-10 At the 
philosophical level the Nicomachean Ethics is of fundamental 
importance to Thomas. He is in agreement with Aristotle as to the 
nature of ethics, the role of contemplation, and the doctrine of the 
virtues. He takes over several definitions, but delves deeper into 
the intelligibility of human acts and uncovers fundamental 
__________________________ 
9. See J. M. RAMÍREZ, “Sur l’organisation du savoir moral”, Bulletin 
Thomiste, 4 (1935), pp. 423 ff.; TH. DEMAN, “L’organisation du savoir moral”, 
Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, (1934), pp. 258-280; 
R. MCINERNY, The Question of Christian Ethics, Washington D.C., 1993. See 
also V. J. BOURKE, “Moral Philosophy Without Revelation”, The Thomist, 40 
(1976), pp. 555-570. 
10. Summa contra Gentiles, III, c. 129: “Ea quae divina lege praecipiuntur 
rectitudinem habent, non solum quia sunt lege posita, sed etiam secundum 
naturam.” 
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structures. He transforms Aristotle’s not always coherent survey of 
virtuous acts, and in particular of prudential activity, into a moral 
philosophy based on the first principles of the practical 
intellect.11 In this connection one should also mention the doctrine 
of the Stoa, with which Thomas was acquainted through Ambrose, 
Augustine, Cicero and Seneca. In the last few years some have 
spoken of a far-reaching influence of the Stoa on Aquinas, in 
particular with regard to his doctrine on the natural law. However, 
if we leave aside the doctrine on natural law, a careful study of the 
passages where the Stoics are mentioned shows that in the great 
majority of cases Thomas rejects their views and prefers the 
position of the Peripatetics.12 
 
 
3. THE NATURE OF ETHICS 
 
A next point to be mentioned is the nature of ethics. Ethics is a 
practical science, concerned with human actions in so far as they 
are related to each other and ordered to the end. Aristotle stressed 
the practical nature of ethics: it does not tell us so much what 
virtue is, as much as it aims at making us good 
persons.13 St. Thomas, on the other hand, emphasizes the cognitive 
nature of ethics more than Aristotle. In order to lead our life as we 
ought, knowledge of the end is necessary;14 however, this 
knowledge should be the basis for right acts. But how one ought to 
act in concrete circumstances is determined by prudence, rather 
than by the inevitably general knowledge of moral 
__________________________ 
11. See our “St. Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on the Nicomachean 
Ethics”, in L. ELDERS; K. HEDWICH, op. cit., p. 47. 
12. Examples are the following dicta: “Omnia peccata esse paria”; “omnes 
passiones esse malas”; “omnem delectationem esse malam”; “bona temporalia 
non esse hominis bona”; “necessitate quadam fatali hominis vitam duci,” etc. See 
also M. SPANNEUT, “Influences stoïciennes sur la pensée morale de saint Thomas 
d’Aquin”, in L. ELDERS; K. HEDWICH, op. cit., pp. 50-79. 
13. Ethic. Nich. 1103b3. 
14. In I Ethic., lect. 2, p. 8, lin. 52-71 (Leonine edition). 
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philosophy.15 Ethics considers man’s actions as directed to his 
ultimate end. Aristotle distinguishes between three branches of 
ethics: the study of human acts as directed to man’s end, man’s 
obligations in the context of family life, and man’s task in political 
society. In his treatment of the main virtues Aquinas deals with 
these various tasks, obligations and rights of human beings. 
The ethics of Aquinas is dominated by the fact that all beings 
strive for the good. All our choices and actions must be directed to 
what is really good for us. Metaphysics shows that the good, the 
object of our appetite, is being. It is our task to realize ourselves by 
uniting ourselves with the good. Ethics does not aim at perfecting 
us as individuals, so that we might stand in solitude amid a neutral 
environment. The end of man is to be united with the good, that is 
with reality as it is in itself.16 This means that ethics instructs us to 
direct our appetite to those things which really perfect us.17 Being 
perfects us,18 and God does so in a superlative way, since he is the 
cause of all good things.19 
 
 
4. THE INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER OF ETHICS: RIGHT REASON 
AND THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE PRACTICAL INTELLECT 
 
As Aristotle had done, Aquinas stresses the role of reason in 
establishing the norms of conduct. On several occasions he quotes 
the saying of Dionysius: “Bonum autem hominis est, secundum 
__________________________ 
15. Cf. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 6, proem.: the science of morals is first 
elaborated in general, next it is applied to particular actions. 
16. Q. d. de veritate, q. 1, a. 2: “motus appetitus terminatur ad res”; q. 8, a. 4, 
ad 5: “affectus terminatur ad res ipsas.” 
17. S. c. G. III, c. 109: “Quaelibet voluntas naturaliter vult illud quod est 
proprium volentis bonum, scilicet ipsum esse perfectum.” Cf. M. C. DONADIO 
MAGGI DE GANDOLFI, Amor y bien. Los problemas del amor en Santo Tomás de 
Aquino, Buenos Aires 1999, p. 105-147. 
18. Q. d. de veritate, q. 21, a. 1: “Ens est perfectivum alterius ...” 
19. In I Ethic., lect. 7. 
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rationem esse.”20 However, he notices a problem here. Reason 
does not become right reason just by itself. Reason considers 
something to be good when it agrees with our basic natural 
inclinations. At this particular point the intellect formulates the first 
principles of moral life. Subsequently reason judges our actions 
with the help of this set of first principles of the moral 
order. Nature places these principles in us, as it also does for the 
first principles of the speculative order. These principles come to 
man naturally on the basis of the most fundamental inclinations of 
the appetite, so that we can say that these principles are seeds of 
the virtues.21 A person makes himself virtuous by acting in 
conformity with these principles.22 When one acts repeatedly 
according to reason, the “form of reason” is impressed in the 
appetite and the virtues are formed. 
There are a number of fundamental inclinations in us, such as 
keeping ourselves alive, seeking shelter, associating with others 
and forming communities, developing ourselves, respecting our 
parents and leaders, securing the survival of mankind by 
procreation, looking for the meaning of life and venerating the 
highest principle and origin of things. 
In a luminous text, Thomas writes that we experience as good 
those things to which we have a natural inclination.23 Our reason 
establishes that such objects are good. Now that which falls under 
the order of reason, also falls under the order established by God 
himself.24 Reason is the measure of what is moral.25 Although to a 
certain extent this doctrine had been prepared by Plato and 
__________________________ 
20. De divinis nominibus, c. 4 (the wording of the original text is 
negative: PG 3, 733). 
21. Q. d. de virtutibus, q. 1, a. 8, ad 10. 
22. In VII Ethic., lect. 8. 
23. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2: “Omnia illa ad quae homo habet 
naturalem inclinationem ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona, et per consequens ut 
opere prosequenda, et contraria eorum ut mala et vitanda.” 
24. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 72, a. 4: “Quaecumque continentur sub ordine 
rationis, continentur sub ordine ipsius Dei.” 
25. S. c. G. III, c. 3: “Moralium autem mensura est ratio.” 
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Aristotle, Thomas developed it in a new way. However, reason, 
insofar as it determines the morality of our acts, must not be seen 
as a self-sufficient and arrogant power; it remains dependent on the 
order of nature. 
The entire treatise of the moral virtues in the Secunda Secundae 
is dominated by two theses: First, that we ourselves must 
determine what, in the different fields of human activity, is 
according to right reason, and second, that actually practicing the 
virtues must also be accompanied by reason,26 since reason must 
determine the mean of the virtues. In doing so it has a certain 
margin.27 
In the activity of reason one may distinguish between that of 
higher reason (ratio superior) and that of lower reason (ratio 
inferior). The former evaluates actions and situation in the light of 
God’s plan, the latter considers them from a human point of 
view. Another distinction is that between universal and particular 
reason: the wife of a murderer on death row and a judge may have 
a different appraisal of what the man’s punishment should 
be. When considering a particular good one must always take into 
account the common good.28 It is obvious that the doctrine of 
reason as determining the morality of our actions is the very center 
of the ethics of Aquinas.29 But this conclusion entails also the 
doctrine of the first principles. 
 
 
__________________________ 
26. In VI Ethic., lect. 11: “Virtutes sunt secundum rationem et cum ratione.” 
Cf. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 58, a. 4, ad 3. 
27. Q. d. de virtutibus, q. 1, a. 13, ad 18: “Medium virtutis secundum 
rationem aliquam latitudinem habet.” 
28. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 19, a. 10: “Non est autem recta voluntas 
alicuius hominis volentis aliquod bonum particulare nisi referat illud in bonum 
commune sicut in finem, cum etiam naturalis appetitus cuiuslibet partis ordinetur 
in bonum commune totius.” 
29. Cf. our essay “Bonum humanae animae est secundum rationem esse”, 
Lugano Theological Review, (1999), pp. 75-90. 
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5. THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE PRACTICAL INTELLECT: THE 
NATURAL LAW 
 
All acts of the intellect and the will in us are derived from that 
which is according to our nature,30 since any reasoning depends on 
the principles which are known to us by nature, while tending to 
good things depends on the natural inclination to the last end. The 
natural law consists in the first principles of the practical intellect, 
which the intellect apprehends immediately because of our 
fundamental inclinations. Thomas holds that the order man must 
follow is based on human nature, and therefore on ontological 
structures: the “ought” is derived from the “is”.31 However, 
differing from a widely held view in his time, Thomas stresses that 
the natural law as such is not inborn in man, although its principles 
are given with human nature. He is referring to the basic 
inclinations and their perception by the intellect, which by 
spontaneous acts formulates the contents of the natural law. Since 
it is rooted in human nature, the natural law is universal and 
permanent.32 
St. Thomas’s argument makes man’s natural inclinations the 
foundation of the natural law precepts, formulated by the intellect, 
and so connects them to the eternal law. On several occasions he 
quotes Psalm 4, 6: “The light of your face, Lord, shines upon my 
mind” to stress that the insights of our reason go back to 
God.33 Certain authors, as G. Grisez, J. Finnis and J. Boyle, 
attempted to safeguard these precepts of the natural law while 
denying their basis in man’s natural inclinations. With regard to 
this point they subscribed to David Hume’s empiricist position, 
according to which it is illicit to attempt to derive the “ought” from 
__________________________ 
30. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 2. 
31. See U. KUHN, Via caritatis. Theologie des Gesetzes bei Thomas von 
Aquin, Göttingen, 1965, p. 106. 
32. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 4 & 5 
33. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 91, a. 3: “... quasi lumen rationis naturalis quo 
discernimus quid sit bonum et quid malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, 
nihil aliud est quam participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura.” 
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the “is”,34 while for Aquinas a human act is morally good when 
conform to man’s nature and ultimate end. However, for Finnis and 
his followers these inclinations are morally neutral. What really 
happens, Finnis says, is that man experiences certain objects as 
good, such as eating reasonably. Finnis enumerates several such 
basic goods which contribute to man’s human fulfillment. In 
directing oneself to these goods, one acts morally. On the other 
hand, Thomas explicitly states that the insights corresponding to 
these inclinations are the natural law.35 Although Finnis appears to 
maintain the contents of the natural law, he separates himself from 
Thomas in denying their foundation in our natural inclinations, and 
so he undermines some of its precepts. For instance, it may happen 
that in certain fields, such as that of procreation, some people no 
longer experience certain goods as Basic.36 Some philosophers 
have suspected that Finnis and the authors within his group have 
yielded ground to a widespread contemporary distrust of human 
nature as the foundation of morality, as well as to Kantian 
philosophy. Other critics argue that human nature is not immutable 
and, therefore, cannot be the foundation of a permanent natural 
law. However, despite any changes which may occur in man’s 
attitudes and ways of life, man’s nature as a rational animal 
remains the same. 
St. Thomas’s doctrine of the natural law stands unshaken. As 
Cardinal Newman says in his The Idea of a University, the basic 
precepts of moral life are reflected in our conscience as the 
mountains surrounding a lake reflect upon the surface of the 
water. Storms may temporarily disturb this reflection, but when the 
weather, i.e. man’s inner life, becomes quiet again, they re-appear. 
This doctrine of the natural law is the basis of man’s natural 
rights. In the early Middle Ages the relation between the spiritual 
order, as represented by the Church and man’s secular life was not 
__________________________ 
34. Treatise of Human Understanding, II, 1, 1. 
35. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2: “... et secundum hanc inclinationem 
pertinent ad legem naturalem ea per quae vita hominis conservatur.” 
36. On Finnis’s theory see his Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford 
(several reprints). 
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always expressed correctly: on certain points the temporal order 
was absorbed by the authority of divine revelation or submitted to 
it. Here, as on so many other questions, Aquinas was the first to 
defend a new view: “The divine law based on God’s grace does not 
do away with the human law as formulated by our reason”.37 This 
declaration of principle is of far reaching importance: in our world 
we cannot allow the violation of human rights as acknowledged by 
reason, under the pretext of what is claimed to be a revelation. We 
have all the more reason of being grateful to St. Thomas for his 
luminous doctrine, which is a God-sent present to the Church and 
all to people of good will. 
 
 
6. ON THE MORAL QUALIFICATION OF OUR ACTIONS 
 
Few questions have been so hotly debated by moral 
philosophers over the past 50 years as that concerning the criteria 
which determine the morality of our actions. According to a 
widespread trend among modern authors, our actions as such lie 
outside the moral order proper —they are pre-moral— and only 
our intentions and/or the resulting effects determine whether the 
actions must be considered good or bad. Thus the intention on the 
one hand, the weighing of the effects (proportionalism) and the 
evaluation of the consequences (consequentialism) on the other are 
claimed to determine the morality of our actions. It would seem 
that those who advance these positions are influenced by 
utilitarianism, a way of looking at things from the point of view of 
their usefulness. In our modern culture, in which people resort all 
the time to technological applications, a utilitarian approach is 
almost a matter of course. But technological applications are no 
__________________________ 
37. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 10, a. 10: “Ius autem divinum, quod est ex 
gratia, non tollit ius humanum quod est ex naturali ratione.” 
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more than means to an end, and man himself is the master who 
decides when and how to use them.38 
It would take us too far from our present subject to explain in 
greater detail the various opinions of the many schools of moral 
philosophy with regards to the criteria of the morality of human 
acts. In the Encyclical Veritatis splendor several of these opinions 
are analyzed and rejected.39 The luminous doctrine of Aquinas on 
this point constitutes the center of the teaching of the encyclical, 
and I shall try to briefly represent it. 
 
 
a) The Object as Determining the Morality of Our Acts 
 
Thomas compares “good” and “bad” as said of actions with 
good and bad as said of things. We call “good” that which has what 
it should have, or which has that which things of its class normally 
have. A thing is bad when something is lacking. A first factor 
which determines the goodness of things is their essential 
form. Man is good because of being a rational animal. Now the 
nature of our acts depends on what they are about. When their 
object is defective, an act is no longer good. However, the object is 
more than just a material thing. When one steals a bicycle, the 
object of the act is the bicycle as belonging to someone else. When 
considered by itself, one might think that the material object 
(whether a thing or a bodily act) is neutral, but in realty such 
material objects are qualified by reason, and related to our 
obligations.40 The real object of our acts is the object as seen by 
__________________________ 
38. See our “De l’homo faber à l’homo sapiens. Le système technicien et la 
morale”, Sedes Sapientiae, 56 (1966), pp. 18-26. 
39. See our “The Encyclical Veritatis Splendor and Dissenting Moral 
Theologians”, in A. GRAF VON BRANDENSTEIN; ET ALII (eds.), Im Dienste der 
inkarnierten Wahrheit. Festschrift zum 25jährigen Pontifikat Seiner Heiligkeit 
Papst Johannes Pauls II, Weilheim, 2003, pp. 243-260. 
40. Q. d. de malo, q. 2, a. 4, ad 5: “Actus autem moralis... recipit speciem ex 
obiecto secundum quod comparactur ad rationem.” 
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reason in the light of our natural ends. The same external act, 
e.g. firing a gun, can have different objects: criminal shooting, 
rightful self-defense, or shooting practice. Therefore Thomas, in 
speaking about the object, also calls it the materia circa quam.41 
A second point stressed by Aquinas is that there are certain 
activities which because of their very nature agree with us, and are 
good as Duch.42 One may think here of eating, resting, learning, 
etc. Moreover, as Veritatis splendor reminds us, there are certain 
acts which by themselves are always wrong. They are signified by 
the negative precepts in the Bible.43 This refutes the theory which 
declares that, except for the objects of the acts corresponding to the 
theological virtues, the matter of ordinary acts is pre-moral or 
morally neutral.44 
 
 
b) The Circumstances 
 
In the question about the moral qualification of human acts, 
Thomas explains that in addition to the act’s fundamental order to 
the object, there are factors which may have some influence on the 
moral goodness or badness of our acts. These factors are the 
circumstances. Since our actions always take place under 
determinate circumstances, such as the acting person, the manner 
of acting, the time and the place, etc., the consideration of these 
__________________________ 
41. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 18, a. 2 ad 2: “Obiectum non est materia ex 
qua, sed materia circa quam.” 
42. S. c. G. III, c. 129: “Sunt igitur aliquae operationes naturaliter homini 
convenientes, quae secundum se sunt rectae en non solum quasi lege positae.” 
43. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 64, a. 2, arg. 3: “Quod est secundum se 
malum nullo bono fine fieri licet”; q. 103, a. 3: “Quod est secundum se malum ex 
genere nullo modo potest esse bonum et licitum.” Cf. S. PINCKAERS, Ce qu’on ne 
peut jamais faire. Les actes intrinsèquement mauvais. Histoire et discussion, 
Fribourg - Paris, 1986. 
44. On the object as determining the goodness of the human acts see 
Th. G. BELMANS, Le sens objectif de l’agir humain,, Città del Vaticano, 1980. 
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circumstances has its place in ethics.45 An action which as such is 
good and which is performed in view of a good end, can 
nevertheless become defective because of wrong circumstan-
ces. Thomas quotes the adagium of Dionysius: “In order to be 
good, all the relevant factors of an act must be good, while any 
defect makes the action defective”.46 
 
 
c) The End 
 
Finally, the end we seek to reach also influences the morality of 
our acts. The end or goal we pursue with a certain act must be 
distinguished from the act as such, as is obvious: a thief steals 
money to have a more comfortable life. Human acts are called 
good also because of the end to which they are ordered. The 
relation of the end to the object of acts is complex. Certain acts as 
such are ordered to a specific end, such as cooking a meal is for the 
purpose of having something to eat. In these cases, Thomas says, 
the object determines the nature of the act. But when the object and 
the end differ, e.g. stealing money to buy drugs, there are two acts 
in one and, in the example, one commits two sins in one act.47 
Related to the above is the theme of conscience. Aquinas has 
innovated on this particular point as well, and has developed an 
admirable doctrine. He places conscience not in the practical, but 
in the speculative intellect.48 The judgment of conscience is the 
conclusion of a syllogism, consisting of a general principle (the 
precepts of the natural law), applied to a particular case. So 
__________________________ 
45. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 18, a. 3, ad 2. 
46. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 18, a. 4: “Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex 
quocumque defectu.” 
47. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 18, a. 7: “Actus qui secundum substantiam 
suam est in una specie naturae, secundum conditiones morales ad duas species 
referri potest.” 
48. Q. d. de veritate, q. 17, a. 1, ad 4: “... in pura cognitione consistit”; In II 
Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 4, ad 2: “conclusio cognitiva tantum.” 
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conscience is the judgment of reason about an act one has 
performed or is about to perform. As such this judgment is not part 
of the choice one has made or is going to make. The verdict of 
conscience has an obligatory character, but it does not force 
us. The will may refuse to follow it and distance itself from what 
the intellect proposes as objectively good. Each choice or decision 
which deviates from what the intellect proposes as right, is bad, for 
one must always follow what reason prescribes and so one must 
not act against the judgment of an erroneous consciente.49 This 
conclusion of Aquinas was new in his time, and in a sense 
revolutionary.50 
The above explanations have made clear that not just the 
intention of the agent, that is the goal he has in mind, determines 
the morality of our actions, as some modern authors hold. An act of 
which the object is morally bad, can never become good because of 
a “good” intention. Some moral philosophers attempted to 
circumvent this by taking up a text of Aquinas where he says that 
an act may in some cases have a double effect. The example is self-
defense, where one protects oneself by knocking out an 
agresor.51 In Thomas’s mind both effects flow from the same act 
and are simultaneous, such that the good effect is not obtained by 
first performing the act with the bad effect. Some moral 
philosophers, such as P. Knauer, apply this to any act: all our 
actions would have good and bad effects, so that one could allow 
the bad result to happen in order to obtain the positive effect. This 
construction, however, is highly artificial. In reality it seldom 
happens that two effects follow simultaneously from one 
action. Knauer’s theory would mean that one may perform a bad 
action in order to obtain some good effect, something positively 
__________________________ 
49. Q. d. de veritate, q. 17, a. 5 ad 4: “Omnis enim homo debet secundum 
rationem agere.” 
50. Cf. E. D’ARCY, Conscience and the Right to Freedom, London, 1961, 
pp. 113 ff.; O. LOTTIN, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, vol. 3, 
pp. 354-406; L. ELDERS, “La doctrine de la conscience de saint Thomas 
d’Aquin”, Revue Thomiste, (1983), pp. 533-557. 
51. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 64, a. 7. 
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excluded by St. Paul.52 Moreover, as we have seen when speaking 
about the object, there are acts which are by themselves bad, and 
which one is never allowed to perform. 
 
 
7. ST. THOMAS ON THE VIRTUES 
 
In the ethics of Aquinas the virtues have a central place. Virtues 
are durable habits in our faculties which incline us to act in 
conformity with right reason and our ultimate end. The virtues give 
uniformity and coherence to our actions, facilitate prompt action 
and give us a certain satisfaction.53 While for Plato, Aristotle, the 
Stoics and Aquinas the virtues were of central importance in man’s 
moral life, in the modern age their study has been neglected. Moral 
philosophers have preferred to organize their treatises around the 
precepts and their relation to man’s freedom. In recent years, 
however, the importance of the virtues has been acknowledged by 
many authors, who hold that moral life is centered around them, so 
that on this point they return to the doctrine of Aquinas.54 
St. Thomas stresses the connection between the virtues and the 
so-called positive precepts of moral law.55 Those affirmative 
precepts oblige in most cases, but not always, since in order to be 
virtuous, acts must be performed under the proper circumstances, 
so that sometimes, when circumstances advice against acting, they 
must be omitted. 
__________________________ 
52. Rom. 3, 8; In epist. ad Romanos, c. 3, lect. 1: “Non est perveniendum ad 
bonum finem per mala.” 
53. Q. d. de virtutibus, q. 1, a. 1: “... ad tria indigetur: primo ut sit 
uniformitas in sua operatione...; secundo ut operatio perfecta in promptu 
habeatur... Tertio ut delectabiliter perfecta operatio compleatur.” 
54. Cf. A. MACINTYRE, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, London, 
1981, and the treatises of Joseph Pieper on the cardinal virtues.  
55. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 32, a. 2: “Praecepta affirmativa legis 
inducunt ad actus virtutum.” 
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Aquinas studies the main moral virtues in qq. 55 to 89 of the 
Secunda Secundae. The text concerns in the first place the acquired 
virtues, which are intimately joined to the infused virtues in 
persons living in grace, and provide an expression in space and 
time of man’s supernatural life, which is developed by the practice 
of the virtues. 
As Aristotle had done before him, Thomas stresses that 
acquiring the virtues is not just a private affair of the individual 
members of society. A right and livable moral order in a society is 
only possible when its citizens are, at least up to a point, virtuous 
people. Another topic dwelt upon by Thomas is the connection 
between the moral virtues. One need not be a philosopher or 
scientist to be virtuous, but without the virtue of prudence the other 
moral virtues are impossible. In order to act always in agreement 
with the virtue of justice one also needs the virtues of courage and 
of temperance. Thomas furthermore deals extensively with 
questions such as the seat of the virtues and the so-called mean of 
the virtues. 
Aquinas first describes the virtues in general as intrinsic 
principles of good actions, in order to deal next with the external 
principles of our acts such as the law, in particular the natural law 
and divine grace. Finally, in the Secunda Secundae he presents a 
detailed study of virtuous acts and of the vices, reducing, as he 
states in the proem of the Secunda Secundae, the entire subject 
matter of the science of morals to the study of the virtues and the 
vices. The virtues, in their turn, are to be reduced to the three 
theological and the four moral virtues.56 This division into a 
treatise of the virtues in general and an exposition of the individual 
virtues is meaningful, and not only because we must deal first with 
what is common and general, before turning to what is 
particular. The treatise of the particular virtues presupposes 
knowledge of the first principles of the practical intellect, that is to 
__________________________ 
56. Summa Theologiae II-II, proem: “Omnes virtutes sunt ulterius 
reducendae ad septem.” 
LEO J. ELDERS, SVD 
456 
say of the natural law, which is studied by Aquinas prior to the 
study of the individual virtues. 
 
 
8. MAN’S AUTONOMY AND FREEDOM 
 
In his Encyclical Veritatis splendor, § 84-87, Pope John Paul II 
mentions a feature of modern man, namely his desire of total 
freedom. But, as the text says, this freedom which is so ardently 
desired, is a freedom which has lost its connection with truth, that 
is, with the natural structure of things and man’s own being. One of 
the objections nowadays advanced by some people against 
traditional moral theology is that it tends to make Christians 
heteronomous, that is, governed by commandments and rules 
imposed on them from the outside. Some existentialist authors 
thought that one becomes a free person only by throwing 
overboard all values and all final ends. 
Let us see what Aquinas has to say on this point. A first 
statement is that by its very nature the human will tends to the 
good. Free choice is not a sort of meteorite appearing out of the 
blue without any connection with man’s inner life. Rather, it grows 
out of a basic inclination of the will to all those things which agree 
with our nature. This inclination is the matrix in which the other 
natural inclinations take form, such as the striving to stay alive and 
to protect oneself, the desire to know the truth, etc. These 
inclinations constitute our spiritual spontaneity which we might 
also call, along with St. Thomas, instinctus rationis.57 
The basic inclination to the good should not be considered as 
“not free.” True, at this level we do not find the freedom of choice, 
but this inclination means that one wills the good consciously and 
__________________________ 
57. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 68, a. 2. 
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because it is good, and that one is acting by oneself.58 This willed 
and approved agreement with one’s nature may also be called 
free. It is a form of freedom which surpasses the freedom of 
choice. 
As we have seen, we must formulate for ourselves the basic 
principles of moral actions. In many circumstances of life we must 
determine, with the help of the virtue of prudence, what is for us 
the correct thing to do. We have, indeed, a very considerable 
amount of autonomy, besides the fact that we ourselves establish 
the precepts of natural law. The ten commandments are not forced 
upon us. Rather they express what we understand ourselves as 
being the right course of action. 
If we deny this natural order of the will to the good in general 
and to certain goods of our human nature, human life will consist 
of a series of unrelated acts.59 Indeed, those who insist on a man’s 
total autonomy claim that everyone must always decide for 
himself, and that human life not aware of itself has no moral 
value.60 A consequence of this view is that no constraint must ever 
be imposed on children. However, failing to submit the young to 
any discipline at all, is likely to prevent the formation of good 
habits and is tantamount to surrendering them to their more 
superficial tendencies and emotions.61 
 
 
__________________________ 
58. S. c. G. III, c. 138: “...necessitas ex interiori inclinatione proveniens... 
facit voluntatem magis intense tendere in actum virtutis”; Q. d. de veritate, q. 22, 
a. 6: “Inest voluntati libertas in quolibet statu naturae respectu cuiuslibet obiecti.” 
59. See S. PINCKAERS, Les sources de la morale chrétienne, Paris, 1990, 
p. 343. 
60. P. SINGER, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Traditional 
Ethics, New York, 1994. 
61. See our “Contemporary Theories of Freedom and Christian Ethics,” in 
Freedom in Contemporary Culture. Acts of the V. World Congress of Christian 
Philosophy, Catholic University of Lublin, 20-25 August 1996, Lublin, 1999, 
pp. 7-21; “La relación entre verdad y libertad en la vida”, in Teología 
moral. Actas del Congreso Internacional, Murcia, 2004, pp. 147-158. 
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9. ABANDONING MAN’S NATURE CONFRONTED WITH ST. 
THOMAS’S REALISM 
 
Some existentialist philosophies disrupt the unity of man. In 
their view, man is essentially a consciousness which happens to 
have a body. The body is opaque and must be considered a mere 
instrument. Man uses it to reach the goals he has set for himself in 
total freedom in order to satisfy his desires. As we said before, 
some moral philosophers tend to disregard the biological facts of 
the human body and to give man free use of his powers, in 
particular in matters related to sexuality. 
There is a certain difficulty here, noticed by Thomas 
himself. When speaking about temperance he writes that one could 
think that such a virtue is out of place, and even against our nature, 
since it is man’s nature that he seeks pleasure. The answer is that 
man is a complex being: certain desires of his sensual being may 
detract from his self-government through reason. But man’s 
specific nature is the entire man in so far as he is governed by 
reason.62 Although certain inclinations of the sensuous appetite, 
and even sometimes of the will, may be opposed to the order of 
reason, man is nevertheless one being with one substantial form, 
viz. the rational soul. This means that his body and his bodily 
functions are human functions and that his sexuality is a human 
sexuality, which must remain under the control of reason and be 
respectful of the other person. It must observe the finality inscribed 
in man’s being and faculties, such as securing the survival of 
mankind and the union, spiritual growth and happiness of the 
married couple. 
For Aquinas man is a being, specified by one substantial form, 
the human soul, so that the body is the expression of the soul, and 
even, in a certain sense, is the soul.63 It is one and the same soul by 
which man is a being, is alive, has sense functions and is 
__________________________ 
62. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 141, a. 1. 
63. S. c. G. IV, c. 81: “Oportet igitur quod corporeitas prout est forma 
substantialis in homine non sit aliud quam anima rationalis.” 
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racional.64 Besides its identification with the body, the soul in its 
deeper nature transcends the body, and therefore can use the body, 
but not as a tool placed at its disposal: the body must serve the 
mind in union with the natural purpose of its organs. 
By disrupting the unity of man, one throws overboard the basic 
inclinations of our being which are the basis of natural law and 
provide the principles of moral action. In this existentialist view 
the only valid precepts are those of charity and of man’s relation to 
God. But for the rest of his actions man would be free to use his 
body any way he wants, provided he does not violate the rights of 
others. In this line of thinking people claim an unlimited right to 
dispose of their own body and the human body in general, a claim 
that ranges from genetic manipulations and homosexual unions, to 
free sex, suicide and euthanasia. The right to life of unborn human 
embryos as well as that of terminally-ill people, is subordinate to 
the well-being or convenience of those who engendered them or 
surround them. 
The thesis that the dynamism of our nature cannot serve as a 
reference for our actions is wrong. There is no opposition between 
man’s freedom and his bodily nature. The intellect knows that the 
end of man is his own good, and is able to discern that which 
agrees with it, and that which does not.65 The body is not a piece of 
crude matter, it is a human body Sexuality does not lie outside the 
order of reason.66 
 
 
__________________________ 
64. Q. d. de anima, a. 1: “Una et eadem forma est per essentiam per quam 
homo est ens actu, et per quam est vivum et per quam est animal et per quam est 
homo.” 
65. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 19, a. 3. 
66. See MSGR. C. CAFARRA, “L’importance pour l’éthique de l’unité 
substantielle de l’homme,” in L’humanisme chrétien au troisième millénaire. La 
perspective de Thomas d’Aquin, Roma, 2003. 
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10. THE HUMANISM OF ST. THOMAS’S ETHICAL DOCTRINE 
 
Thus far we have discussed the main characteristics of 
Aquinas’s ethical doctrine and pointed out the unequaled 
accomplishment of his synthesis. However, our survey would not 
be complete without some examples of how profoundly humane 
this moral theory is in its applications, while it nevertheless 
upholds the highest ends for man, as well as the ideal of sanctity. 
A first point is his appreciation of the passions and 
emotions. While an author such as Cicero considered the passions 
as weak spots or diseases of the human psyche,67 Aquinas argues 
that nature has given them to us as a support and source of 
energy. As natural movements they possess an ontological 
goodness. They are morally neutral, as long as the will does not 
intervene and are good when reason controls them and associates 
them with the virtues.68 
Related to this position concerning passions and emotions is the 
appreciation of pleasure. Against the opinion of some authors who 
consider any form of pleasure to be bad, St. Thomas defends the 
goodness of certain forms of pleasure: when the appetite rests in a 
good, in conformance with reason, one experiences a pleasure 
which is morally good. If an act as such is good, resulting from a 
right choice of the will, the pleasure which accompanies it is also 
good.69 This applies also to sexual intercourse between married 
persons. This doctrine witnesses to St. Thomas’s positive vision of 
the human body and its natural functions 
An interesting example of Thomas’s broad vision and closeness 
to reality is his opinion about lending money or one’s belongings 
to other persons. It is allowable to demand a compensation for 
services rendered and for not being able to dispose meanwhile 
oneself of what one has lent to others. This is not a question of 
__________________________ 
67. Tusculanae disputationes, II, c. 4 
68. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 24, a. 2. 
69. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 34, a. 1 & 2. 
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asking a compensation for the use of money as such, but of 
avoiding damage or loss to oneself. He who lends money to others 
so that they may conduct business is entitled to demand a share in 
the profit.70 
The pages on keeping measure in sport and play, as well as on 
taking care of one’s outward appearance are also typical of 
Aquinas’s humanism. The body and the soul need some rest, even 
after intellectual work. One finds relaxation in sport and in games, 
but these should be adapted to the person, age and occupation in 
question.71 
Finally, Thomas’s pages on friendship and love are one of the 
finest parts of his ethics. He describes the effects of love. The 
possibility of unselfish love, doubted by many, is vigorously 
defended as based on the fact that the will first moves to the good 
as such: it seeks the good before seeking its own pleasure.72 This 
argument also shows that it is possible to love God more than 
oneself, since God is the universal good and the source of all good 
things. In this way pure love concerns the good of a person who is 
deserving of being loved. Furthermore, Thomas laid down an ordo 
amoris, the order to be observed in our love of persons and 
things.73 In his pages on friendship Thomas borrows from Aristotle 
the five properties of friendship, stressing the last of them, i.e. to 
agree with a friend in feelings and thought. Because of his social 
nature man must live together with others. The ideal is to be 
together with friends: therefore, people should treat each other 
kindly and be ready to help and should rejoice in the virtuous acts 
of others. A friend is an alter ego, and so we are happy for his 
accomplishments; in addition, by considering what our friend is, 
__________________________ 
70. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 78, a. 2. 
71. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 168, a. 2. 
72. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2: “Intellectus apprehendit 
universalem rationem boni ad cuius consecutionem sequitur delectatio; unde 
principalius intendit bonum quam delectationem.” 
73. Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 26, a. 1-12. 
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we increase our own happiness. Friendship is part of that happiness 
that can be attained in this life.74 
 
 
11. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ETHICS OF ST. THOMAS FOR OUR 
TIME 
 
During the past fifty year there has been an enormous shift in 
people’s views of what is moral or immoral. As to macro-morality, 
standards have become much stricter. People at large accept some 
responsibility for the preservation of rare species of plants and 
animals, as well as for the protection of our natural 
environment. Human rights are better acknowledged and respected 
than in the past. 
However, in parallel with this progress there has been a 
considerable retrogression on the level of individual morality. A 
widespread subjectivism makes people forget the objective 
character of their moral obligations. Individual man with his 
desires and instincts makes himself the yardstick of what he can 
do. Objective durable bonds at the interpersonal level are avoided, 
in order to safeguard one’s own freedom. Institutions such as the 
family and the state are in crisis. Man’s personal conscience, cut 
loose from any connections with traditional morality or human 
nature, becomes the decisive authority for determining what is 
good and what is evil. The plurality of opinions and the respect due 
to all of them makes people uncertain as to what is true. It is very 
difficult, if not impossible, in our pluralistic societies to reach a 
consensus on questions about moral life. 
This revolution in moral thinking is also an effect of the 
technological revolution, of intensive contact with other 
civilizations, of far reaching changes in our societies and the 
relative well being of large groups of the population which allows 
__________________________ 
74. On the above see the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, IX, 
lect. 6-10. 
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them to spend their wealth on purposes which are less than 
necessary. Further causes are industrialization and the 
emancipation of women. People are now living in a world 
dominated by technology. The result is that the language of nature, 
which is also that of morals, is no longer understood. 
The ethics of Aquinas has as its foundation human nature, and 
has been built with irrefutable arguments into a coherent whole. It 
purports to make us live according to what is best is us. Precisely 
because of its superior reasonableness, which takes the entire 
human person into account as a human individual and a member of 
society, it will be a decisive factor in guiding the moral life of 
people in the future. It arises as a lighthouse above the fog of 
confused moral thinking of many of our contemporaries. For 
Catholic theologians, on the other hand, it is an unsurpassed 
instrument to understand and to explain the will of God as 
manifested in divine revelation. As Prof. Takeda, a Japanese 
convert, who spent many years translating parts of the Summa 
Theologiae, once told me, the admirable depth, truth and greatness 
of St. Thomas’s doctrine can only be explained if we consider it a 
gift of God to the Church and to mankind.75 
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__________________________ 
75. For a more complete and up to date exposition of Aquinas’s ethics see 
S. J. POPE (ed.), The Ethics of Aquinas, Washington D.C., 2002; L. J. ELDERS, 
The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas, Frankfurt am Main, 2005. 
